A Critique of Dyadic Design by Cranmer, Skyler J. & Desmarais, Bruce A.
A Critique of Dyadic Design
Skyler J. Cranmer∗1 and Bruce A. Desmarais†2
1Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University
2Department of Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University
Forthcoming at International Studies Quarterly
Abstract
Dyadic research designs concern data that comprises interactions among actors. Dyadic
approaches unambiguously constitute the most frequent designs employed in the empirical
study of international politics, but what do such designs cary with them in terms of the-
oretical claims and statistical problems? These two issues are closely intertwined. When
testing hypotheses empirically, the statistical model must be a careful operationalization of
the theory being tested. Given that the theoretical and statistical cannot be separated, we
discuss dyadic research designs from these two perspectives; highlighting model misspeci-
fication, erroneous assumptions about independence of events, artificial levels of analysis,
and the incoherent treatment of multilateral/multiparty events on the theoretical side and
difficult-to-escape challenges to valid inference on the statistical side.
Introduction
As social scientists, the objects of our inquiries are social systems. As can be deduced from the
subfield’s name, International Relations (IR) scholarship focuses on relational systems. Relational
systems are observed as relational data, in which data exhibit two levels of observation – the
actors (i.e., units, or nodes and vertices in network theoretic terminology) and the interactions
among actors (i.e., relationships, ties, or edges in network terminology). Relational data1 includes
∗cranmer.12@osu.edu
†bdesmarais@psu.edu
1We should note that relational data are distinct from but potentially related to relational theory. For example,
relational social theory – popularized in voluminous works by scholars such as Tilly (2003) and White (2008) –
takes a network oriented perspective on social relations. Relational data are necessary to test relational theories,
but one need not have a relational (network) theory to analyze relational data.
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both data on single dyads (e.g., a conflict between two states) and data consisting of several actors
and simultaneously established ties (e.g., a multi-state defensive alliance). The relationships of
interest (e.g., conflict, alliances, trade) are often reduced to observations of whether pairs (i.e.
dyads) of nations are incident to domain-specific connections (e.g., at war, mutually defensively
allied). A research design is dyadic when such dyads are considered as isolated components
of the larger relational system. In this essay, we discuss the limitations of dyadic designs for
developing explanatory, causal, or predictive models of international relational systems. We show
that there exist two conditions under which dyadic designs would be an appropriate approach.
Both conditions relate to hyperdyadic dependence; a condition under which the state of dyadic
relationships depends upon the states of other dyadic relationships. The first condition is simply
the assumption that there are no hyperdyadic dependencies (i.e., that dyads do not depend upon
each other). The second condition is an absence of interest in hyperdyadic dynamics paired with
an assumption of no confounding of systemic patterns and covariates of interest. If neither of
these conditions hold, it is our position that strictly dyadic designs are inappropriate and will
often lead to faulty inferences.
In the past several decades, the study of interstate conflict has adopted a heavy focus on
dyads as a unit of analysis (the dyadic literature is far too voluminous to begin citing here,
but consider just a few prominent examples that explicitly discuss dyadic design from author’s
whose names begin with “B”: Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992); Bremer (1992); Bremer
et al. (2003); Bennett and Stam (2004)). A great deal of work has focused on dyadic attributes
as explanations for peace and violence. Theories in this vein consider geographical mechanisms,
like whether the states in the dyad are contiguous, as well as relational mechanisms, like whether
the states share alliances or memberships in intergovernmental organizations, or economic and
diplomatic relations within the dyad, as predictors of the probability of conflict. Much has been
made of joint democracy within the dyad (Oneal and Russett, 1999; Maoz and Russett, 1993;
Ellis et al., 2010), as well as differences in power and capabilities, also frequently feature in these
studies. Despite this wide range of explanations, however, these theories all share an emphasis on
the influence of direct ties between states. Recent work has shown that a focus on dyads is both
theoretically incomplete and empirically problematic (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011; Cranmer
et al., 2012a,b; Manger et al., 2012; Ward and Hoff, 2007; Warren, 2010; Ward et al., 2011; Dorff
and Ward, 2013). The focus on dyads overlooks extra-dyadic and systemic effects that might
yield interesting findings. Furthermore, a dyadic analysis necessarily ignores the fact that states
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in the international system are embedded in a dense web of economic, political, and social ties.
Lastly, we note that our discussion is limited to a critique of dyadic design. The reader may
be dissatisfied with the presentation of problems absent solutions, but our essay is restricted to
the subject of dyadic design. We attempt to stay strictly on that topic, though we do allude
briefly to some solutions to some of the problems we discuss. Suffice it to say that alternative
methodologies exist and are well-implemented in software that can solve most of the problems
we highlight here, but a detailed discussion of these techniques is beyond the scope of the present
essay.
The Difference Between the Study of Relationships and Dyadic
Design
The first thing we wish to highlight is that a dyadic design is different from an interest in
relationships. Indeed, the dyad is the simplest level of measurement at which a relationship can
be recorded. Sets of relationships are usually studied as dyads and dyadic relationships are an
item of interest even in network scientific approaches to relational systems – which include, but
are not limited to, dyadic designs. An interest in relationships is fundamental to the study of
international relations.
What does a dyadic design mean? Dyadic design refers to the empirical design commonly
applied to the study of international politics in which dyads, either directed or undirected, are
the units of analysis and a regression model is applied with dyadic measurements as the outcome
variable. One key feature of a truly dyadic design is that the dyadic outcome observations are
not used to explain each other. We use the common notation of yij as the outcome variable
observation for the dyad including state i and state j (undirected) or i to j (directed). In a
dyadic design, the covariates used in predicting yij do not involve ykl ∀ {i, j, k, l} (i.e., the other
dyads in the system).2 For example, the “standard” model of conflict applies such a design.
In these models, the outcome variable is the presence of conflict, measured dyadic ally, with
potential predictors including (but not limited to) joint democracy, trade dependence, joint IGO
membership, and CINC ratio3. Such a model is then analyzed using logistic regression either on
2Readers may note that this definition excludes logistic regression models that involve network statistics on
the right hand side. That is intentional. Such models constitute conditionally specified Chen (2010) exponential
family random graph models, and the forms of dependence they imply are more than dyadic.
3We consider this somewhat generic model rather than pick on any one particular scholar who has published
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the set of all dyads or only politically relevant dyads. In this discussion, we voice criticism of
two problematic aspects of such dyadic designs: dyadic theory, the (potential) pitfalls of thinking
dyadically and the misspecification of theory that can arise, and dyadic analysis, the practice
of analyzing dyadic data with regression-style techniques. We will show that models such as
the one described above are theoretically limited to the point of misspecification and sufficiently
problematic empirically that one cannot have confidence in inferences drawn from such a model.
An interest in relationships need not translate into a dyadic design such as that above or
discussed in detail below. A variety of approaches facilitate the study of relationships without the
restrictions of dyadic designs. In our own research, we have come to view relational phenomena
in international politics as network phenomena; a perspective that, we believe, provides a sound
treatment of relational data as forming interconnected relational systems. Relational hypotheses
from such a perspective make use of dyads: theory may suggest certain processes occurring in
the dyadic relations between two states and complex networks are the product of many dyadic
relationships. But a perspective that leverages information from outside the dyad and considers
more than dyadic phenomena as part of the model necessarily breaks from the tradition of dyadic
design in IR.
Limitations of Dyadic Theory
In this section, we lay out a critique of dyadic design from a theoretical perspective. Not all
theories tested with a dyadic design face the problems we mention below. For most political
scientists, theory is more easily malleable than empirical models and many examples may be
found in which the theory is free of the shortcomings we discuss, but the empirical analysis is
not. That said, we do believe that theoretical problems discussed below are endemic to the study
of international politics and represent a serious challenge to the development of sound, consistent,
and complete theoretical explanations for a range of important international phenomena. Thusly,
we propose the following as a criticism of what we see as trends in the literature rather than
absolute and intractable problems of theory. We also note that some of the theoretical critiques
discussed below are implied by the statistical model (per definition a careful operationalization
of theory) if not made explicit by the researcher.
an empirical analysis with a dyadic design.
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The difference between a model and a hypothesis
A preface to our theoretical critique of dyadic design is that we must first be clear on the difference
between a hypothesis about a process and a model of the same process. Both are deduced from
theory. A hypothesis, at least as commonly used in international relations, is a simple statement
of how, based on an underlying causal theory, two processes are expected to covary. For example,
one expects that as trade between a pair of states increases, the probability of those same states
going to war with one another is diminished. Such hypotheses are usually the primary interests
of scholars who develop research designs, including dyadic designs, for relational data. Over time
and multiple studies, we build empirical support for such hypotheses and thus come to believe
that they and their underlying causal theory are a step in the right direction with respect to
understanding the process by which nature generates the phenomena of interest.
A model is a comprehensive specification of the entire data generating process. If correctly
specified, a model will generate artificial datasets that stochastically approximate observed data.
In other words, a model includes all relevant predictors and other generative features, which incor-
porate the entire range of phenomena likely to cause the outcome. When conducting model-based
inference, in which each hypothesis is evaluated with reference to a parameter in a statistical
model of observational data, a comprehensive model is needed to test hypotheses (i.e., as com-
pared to design-based inference, in which the researcher exercises experimental control of data
generation). Correctly specifying the model eliminates the bias caused by omitted variables that
are casually related to the outcome. The sole exception to this, and the reason we say “ ‘near
complete” is because a model can be a less-than-complete description of the entire data gener-
ating process in the event that those omitted factors are orthogonal to the predictors. In other
words, in order to leave certain factors out of a model, we must have reason, at least theoretically
if not empirically, to think that these omitted factors have no systematic relationship to any of
the predictors. In such a case, it is only necessary to use a robust covariance matrix in parametric
inference or nonparametric inference procedures such as the jackknife or bootstrap.
Our point here is to emphasize the fact that, just as important as what is included in the
theory, is what is omitted from the theory. Statistical models, from which we find either support
or a lack of support for our theories, are careful operationalizations of theory, so it is worthwhile
to consider some things that are assumed orthogonal (and thus not modeled) in dyadic designs
from a theoretical perspective.
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Assumption: dyads exist in isolation
A fundamental assumption of dyadic analysis is that dyads exist in isolation from anything else
going on in the world, with respect to the outcome variable, during the period of observation
for the dyad. This may not be an assumption the analyst wishes to make, but it is strongly
implied by the application of a dyadic quantitative design, such as a dyadic regression model.
Fundamental to the regression model, as discussed from a statistical perspective below, is the
assumption that observations are conditionally independent from one another, that conditioning
being on the included predictors. Translating this into the terms of our example model from
above, this implies that, conditional on things like shared regime, trade dependence, and CINC
ratio, the dyad of states i and j is entirely unrelated to anything else happening in the world.
This includes i’s relationships with other states (e.g. the dyads ik, il,. . . ) and all other dyads
(e.g dyads ab, cd, . . . ). Let us consider a few basic logical tests of this assumption.
Consider the first type, involving the multiple relations of one state, first. A more detailed
examination of an example given by Cranmer et al. (2012b) will illustrate the point nicely. In
1939 a new dyadic conflict connection was formed between the UK and Germany. Let us denote
this dyad bg (b for Britain). Yet there was, at least, one other dyad formed that year: by
the German invasion of Poland. Let us call this dyad gp. Dyadic design requires (and thus
assumes) that the bg and gp dyads areentirely unrelated to each other, conditional on things like
an indicator for common regime type and CINC ratios. Were one to proffer such an explanation
for these ties at a professional meeting of conflict scholars, one would be laughed out of the room.
Yet this is precisely what is implied by a dyadic design applied to the problem of international
conflict. Needless to say, such an assumption has been tacitly made whenever dyadic analyses
have been published and much of our understanding of international phenomena ranging from
war to trade is based such tacit theoretical claims. It is also worth noting here that the fact
that two events are separate by no means implies that they are independent. Indeed, mutual
exclusivity is a strong form of dependence. So, just because the decisions by the German and
British governments respectively to wage war on Poland and Germany, also respectively, does
not in the least imply that they were independent. The British government gave the invasion of
Poland as its primary reason for war with Germany and, absent such an invasion, the war may
well not have occurred.
We can use the domain of defensive alliance formation to further probe the validity of the
assumption that dyads ij are independent of other dyads ab. Let us consider the First World
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War. Is it reasonable and consistent with both theory and history to assume that, say the British
alliance with France (dyad bf) is completely independent of the alliance between Wilhelmen
Germany and Austria-Hungary (the dyad ga)? Given that the one alliance was formed in order
to balance the other, it seems misguided to search primarily for explanatory power in dyadic
covariates such as regime similarity and CINC ratios.
And what of phenomena occurring in the larger neighborhood of the focal dyad (and possibly
involving it)? In a study of international alliances, Cranmer et al. (2012a) theorize that a dyadic
alliance is more attractive to the prospective allies when that alliance is embedded within a dense
clique of states that are all allied to each other. This is an application of the common network
theory that triadic bonding reinforces dyadic trust. Both Cranmer et al. (2012a) and Cranmer
et al. (2012b) show that triadic closure is a relational process that is key to accurately predicting
the ultra-dense cliques that characterize the defense alliance network. Is it reasonable to think
of this phenomena, which occurs at the triadic (or higher) rather than the dyadic level, as either
not being a meaningful part of the data generating process, or as being completely orthogonal
to the dyadic predictors included in a given model? Such assumptions would not be tolerated if
directed at a strongly performing control variable, such as same regime type or relative military
capabilities, but that assumption is made any time a dyadic research design is applied.
To argue the validity of the dyadic design, one may object that the variety of hyper-dyadic
dependencies just discussed, while maybe not unimportant for the data generating process, are
orthogonal to the dyadic predictors included in the model. Such an objection is to take the
attitude that, though strictly dyadic models are substantively misspecified, hypothesis tests
derived from the dyadic model are robust to this particular form of misspecification. Such an
assumption, which boils down to one of orthogonality of all predictors to the higher order system
factors, is rather bold. It is the case that, in the event of orthogonality, an empirical analysis is
not biased by the omission of such factors and thus model misspecification is less consequential –
possibly only affecting covariance estimates. Just as it is rarely justified to assume that important
omitted covariates are orthogonal to those one has included, there is no sound scientific basis
upon which to presume that covariates are orthogonal to the effects of system structure on dyadic
outcomes.
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Artificial Levels of Analysis
The so-called “levels of analysis” in international relations – state, dyad, and system (see e.g.
Mitchell et al. (1999) and Bennett and Stam (2004))– are artificial and are products of our
measures and the units of analysis on which we focus in common regression models. This is not
a problem unique to dyadic design, but dyadic design is one incarnation of the problem. But let us
consider this problem in the context of dyadic design. The critical theoretical question one must
ask is: though our outcome of interest is relational (dyadic), what makes us think that all of the
relevant predictors of this phenomena are also relational and concern only the relations between
the two states in the focal dyad? In other words, a focus on independent dyads neglects the fact
that what happens at other levels of aggregation of dyads (e.g., state, entire system/network,
region, triads) has implications for the dyadic outcomes of which the higher level outcomes are
comprised. For example, Cranmer et al. (2014) show that there are popularity (i.e., pile-on)
effects in the network of international economic sanctions. When one state sanctions state A,
other states then become more likely to sanction state A. Theory specified at the dyadic level
implies that no such higher order (i.e., hyperdyadic) patterns in tie formation exist.
We argue that the focus on any one level of analysis, including dyadic analysis which can be
said to be the most common of the levels of analysis, is either (a) a very bold claim about the
data generating process, or (b) an example of theoretical myopia driven by the availability of data
(e.g. mostly dyadic) and the data formatting constraints associated with conventional statistical
models (e.g. traditional regression). Most would find (a) highly unrealistic substantively, so we
suspect that much of the focus on dyads is driven by (b). Yet this is an example of a drunkard’s
search; searching for one’s keys under the lamplight because that is where one can see rather than
because that is where one believes them to have been misplaced. If (b) occurs, this is obviously
bad for the scientific process: our theories should not be driven by available techniques and data,
but rather data should be gathered and statistical techniques developed, if necessary, to follow
theory.
Incoherent treatment of multilateral/multiparty events
Thus far we have presented dyadic outcomes as being interdependent – influencing each other.
For example, Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) demonstrate that the international conflict network
is intransitive in that two states – A and B – in conflict with a third state C – are statistically
unlikely to be at war with each other. This is an interdependence result regarding individual
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dyadic outcomes, including the absence of a tie (i.e. a conflict). The key feature of the network
modeling approach is that it is not required that the analyst assume these separate dyadic out-
comes are independent dyadic outcomes. This leads to our last theoretical critique of the dyadic
independence approach. Even though it may not cause bias from a statistical perspective, dyadic
design is problematic with respect to the sensible treatment of multilateral and/or multiparty
events. The nature of this problem should be obvious from our above discussion of WWII. Was
the German invasion of Poland a different war from the British war with Germany? Was the
American war with Germany different from the Canadian? There were certainly differences in
the way these countries participated in the war; in their strategies, their forces brought to bear
and so forth, but they were not different wars. Cranmer et al. (2012b) point out that, dyadically,
WWI and WWII constitute over 500 different wars (completely independent remember, condi-
tional on regime similarity and CINC ratios if we are applying a dyadic design) and more than
half of the wars in the 20th Century.
The lack of face validity to this treatment of two wars should be cause for pause from analysts
seeking to model any relational phenomena that is, or has the potential to be, multilateral.
Multilateral events, of course, consist of several dyadic relations that presumably could dissolve
while the others stay in place, but multilateral events often arise due to complex interdependence
among actors and dyadic relations. A dyadic design simply cannot accommodate multilateral
data without imposing strong assumptions about the independence of dyadic events; assumptions
that at worst bias statistical models and risk faulty inference, or at best result in a grossly
unrealistic view of the data and their corresponding generating process (i.e., that the alignment
of multilateral relations is purely coincidental).
A variety of solutions to this problem have been posited in the literature. For example, Poast
(2010) proposed a k-adic rather than dyadic design. A k-adic tie exists among k states if all k
states are tied to each other (e.g., as in a multilateral alliance). In our own research, we have
adopted a network perspective that treats the entire complex network of ties as an observation,
allowing for near arbitrary order dependencies to exist in the data. By explicitly modeling the
interdependence among relationships, network models can be tuned to predict the alignment
of k-adic relations (with heterogeneity in k), which codify as multilateral relational outcomes.
For example, as discussed above, network models of defense alliance formation predict strong
triadic closure effects, which leads to a network of moderate to high-order k-ads (Cranmer et al.,
2012b,a).
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Limitations of Dyadic Methods (regression)
In this section we discuss the limitations of dyadic analysis, which we take to mean regression
analysis on dyadic data, from a statistical perspective. We should be clear that we are not
making a case against the development and specification of hypotheses based on dyadic covariates.
Dyadic covariates represent an essential class of terms that should be included in hyperdyadic
models. Rather, our critique of dyadic regression applies to the use of regression models for
dyadic dependent variables to estimate the effects of exogenous covariates without accounting
for hyperdyadic dependence.
Problematic inference in realistic applications
The major concern we have with dyadic design and analysis, more pressing even than the theo-
retical limitations discussed above, is the fact that dyadic designs will produce biased estimates
and incorrect inferences in hypothesis testing in most applications. The conditions necessary for
a dyadic design to be unbiased are essentially the same as those laid out above in the section
discussing theoretical limitations. It must be the case that all dyadic observations are condition-
ally independent from one another. In other words, conditional on the right hand side of the
regression, it must be the case that the relationships among states do not affect other relation-
ships among states (including the other relationships of members of a given focal dyad), state or
substate attributes and processes are not allowed to affect the outcome in any way that might
be related to the included dyadic predictors, and that neither proximate (e.g. neighborhood) or
system level effects may affect the outcome and be related in any way to the dyadic predictors.
Given a century or more of development of the modern globalized economy, the activity of highly
developed institutions of international law and governance, and the rapid global flows of infor-
mation; it is hard to imagine any context in international relations in which an across-the-board
assumption of dyadic independence would be tenable.
To see how misspecification manifests, let us consider the matter of statistical independence.
The formal definition of statistical independence is:
p(a ∩ b) = p(a)p(b).
In other words, the joint probability of some event a and some other event b is the product of
their marginal probabilities. The reasoning behind this definition is made more clear when we
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consider that, from the basic laws of probability, we have:
p(a|b) = p(a ∩ b)
p(b)
,
which can be rearranged to show that
p(a ∩ b) = p(a|b)p(b).
The above equation will only reduce to p(a ∩ b) = p(a)p(b) in the event that a and b are
independent. The extension of the above to the case of conditional independence is simple: if
independence is conditional on some third event c, we have p(a ∩ b|c) = p(a|c)p(b|c).
Statistical independence is fundamental and inexorable from regression-based statistical mod-
els. For illustration, consider the generalized linear model –of which the Gaussian linear model,
logistic/probit regression, count models, survival models (exponential and Weibull, not Cox),
and many more commonly used models are special cases. In order to keep the notation general,
we can write any likelihood function as
L(θ|y,X) =
n∏
i=1
f(yij |xij , θ)
where θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated, y is the response vector (i.e., the dependent
variable), X is the data matrix (i.e., the covariates), f is some probability density function (e.g.
Gaussian for a linear model, Poisson for a Poisson model, Bernoulli for logit/probit), yij is the
dyadic response between states i and j, and xij is a vector of predictors measured on the ij dyad.
The very reason we are able to evaluate a joint likelihood for all the data by taking the product
over dyadic probabilities is because of the assumption that all observations are independent and
identically distributed (iid) conditional on the covariates. The “identically distributed” part of
this assumption is less relevant to this discussion, but the “independent” part is central. Note
that the structure of this model implies that dyadic outcomes used as the dependent variable
in one observation cannot be used to construct independent variables in another observation.
Such a specification, examples of which are proposed in Neumayer and Plümper (2010), violate
the independence assumption by construction. We have already considered the multitude of
unreasonable and untenable theoretical assumptions imposed on the analyst through the dyadic
design’s necessity for iid, but now we see that we cannot even build a proper likelihood function
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absent this statistical independence. In other words, one can compute the product over the
dyadic probabilities – thus invoking the iid assumption, doing so will not produce errors or
warnings in software – but the result will be coefficients and standard errors with an arbitrary
amount of bias. Indeed, the idea that one could produce an unbiased result with such a model
violates the basic axioms of probability.
Under what circumstances would a regression based on dyadic data be unbiased? Naturally,
the model results will be unbiased when iid is satisfied. This implies all of the assumptions
discussed in our theory section above. In the specific case in which dyadic events/connections do
not depend on each other, and when subnational/national/k-adic/system effects are orthogonal
to the dyadic predictors, no bias will be induced into the statistical model through application
of a dyadic research design. Bias will necessarily be introduced in all other cases. Crucially, even
if the researcher is only interested in the effect of one or more dyadic covariates (e.g., one has
a genuinely dyadic theory about the effect of geographic distance on the likelihood of conflict), a
dyadic design is still biased if there are unmodeled hyperdyadic dependencies that generated the
data – as we demonstrate below with a simulation experiment.
How severe will the bias in results from a dyadic design be, given that bias will be present
in (nearly) all realistic data-analysis situations? This will depend on the specific case. Bias will
range from minor, not affecting any substantive inferences, to severe, radically altering substan-
tive inferences, depending on the extent to which un-modeled (in a dyadic design, un-modelable)
dependencies are present. Generally speaking, the greater the un-modeled dependence, the
greater the bias, but some models and functional forms are especially susceptible to this form of
bias. It is often difficult to know, a priori, the extent of these dependencies and thus the degree
of bias that will be induced by following a dyadic design. One must also further wonder why a
dyadic design would be applied when powerful techniques, such as the exponential random graph
model (ERGM), are capable of modeling relational data whilst unifying levels of analysis and
producing unbiased results (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011).
ERGMs are statistical models for matrixes of relationships among actors (i.e., adjacency
matrices in which the ij cell records the 0/1 dyadic relationship between i and j). Terms used to
explain relationships in ERGMs can include dyadic covariates, as in dyadic regression, as well as
higher order terms such as the number of reciprocated ties in the matrix (i.e., instances in which
the ij and ji elements of the matrix are both 1) and the number of triangles in the matrix (i.e.,
the number of triples {i, j, k} in which there is a tie between each pair in the triple). Though
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unlikely, it is possible that the network under study exhibits little or no hyperdyadic dependence,
in which case an inferential network model may represent over-specification. In this case, where
an independent dyadic design would be appropriate, the ERGM will reduce to logistic regression
(Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011) and accurately reflect the lack of interdependence.
By using inferential network analysis to study systems constituted by dyads, researchers can
both account for hyperdyadic dependence and test whether a dyadic independence approach
is appropriate. Further, it is important to be clear that taking a network inference approach
does not imply complete interdependence among observations. Rather, network methods permit
specification of and testing for precise forms of interdependence; the models account for as much
interdependence as the analyst chooses to model. For example, if an ERGM is specified such that
the terms include the number of mutual dyads in the network (i.e., to model reciprocity) and a
list of dyadic covariates, then yij only depends on yji and is independent of all other potential
relationships in the network.
Having discussed the problems inherent to dyadic regression and presented the ERGM as
an archetypal solution to those problems, we should review two conditions such that if both
conditions apply dyadic regression can be used in the context of hyperdyadic dependence. The
first condition is that the researcher observes the timing of relationship states (i.e., the dyadic
data is time-stamped). The second condition is that the state of relationships in period t de-
pends only upon the structure of relationships in time periods prior to t. In other words, there
is no simultaneous dependence among relationships. If these two conditions apply, dyadic re-
gression in which functions of the network of relationships in previous time periods (e.g., the
number of shared partners between two states in the previous time point) operate as covariates
to account for hyperdyadic dependence. In the context of temporal exponential random graph
models (TERGMs), Hanneke et al. (2010) show that logistic regression can be used to estimate
“separable” TERGMs, which are models in which the states of dyadic relationships at time t are
independent conditional upon the past states of the network.
The danger of faulty inference is raised all the more by the fact that this type of bias will often
falsely attributed explanatory power caused by the dependencies between dyadic connections to
the covariates. We illustrate this attribution error below. As a result, we believe that the
application of dyadic design by an analyst gives the reader substantial grounds upon which to
doubt the validity of the study, both theoretically and empirically. We end our methodological
discussion on a clear statement on the degree of hyperdyadic dependence necessary to justify
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a rejection of strictly dyadic methods. Dyadic designs should only be used if the researcher is
comfortable assuming that there are no hyperdyadic dependencies. Otherwise there is no way
to know a priori how results from strictly dyadic methods will differ from those that account
for hyperdyadic dependence. This is not to say that all inferences made based on dyadic design,
which encompasses most of the last 30 years of empirical research in international relations, are
incorrect. We suspect that many are probably correct. But the above does suggest that most of
this literature presents biased results and, absent an a priori reason to believe that a variable
of interest is orthogonal to the networks in which the observations occur or a direct replication
that accounts for network dependencies, the inferences might reasonably be suspect.
A Concise Illustration of the Consequences of Model Misspecification
The central focus of this essay has been a critique of approaches to studying pairwise state
relationships in IR that apply assumptions of dyadic independence. Here, we provide a concise
example that illustrates how the statistical argument for using multiple, rather than simple
(one predictor), regression, seamlessly applies to the ways in which an a priori commitment
to an approach that requires dyadic independence can bias inferences. Perhaps the strongest
argument for a multiple regression approach is that it can adjust for the effects of confounders
in estimating the relationship between one or more focal predictors and the dependent variable.
In exactly the same way, higher order network structures, for which it is impossible to adjust in
dyadic independence models, can confound relationships between covariates and dyadic outcome
variables. One of the major threats to inference presented by confounders is that failure to
adjust for them can result in a considerably increased Type 1 error rate in hypothesis testing.
That is, failure to adjust for confounders can lead researchers to reject the null hypothesis of
no relationship when there is actually no relationship at a higher rate than they would if they
were to adjust for the confounders. Here, we show how dyadic regression in the presence of
confounding hyperdyadic dependence can lead to a dramatically inflated Type 1 error rate.
We use the Exponential Random Graph family of models (i.e., the ERGM) (Holland and
Leinhardt, 1981; Wasserman and Pattison, 1996; Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011) to generate
relational data with a hyperdyadic dependence structure. Using the ERGM, we generate random
networks in which the tie Yij depends upon all other directed dyads in which j is the recipient,
which we denote Y−i,j . The form of the exponential random graph model that we use to generate
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networks is given by the following specification:
P (Y ) =
exp{−3.5× E(Y ) + 0.75× IS2(Y )− 0.1× IS3(Y )}
C(θ)
,
where E(Y ) is the number of edges in the network, IS2(Y ) is the number of in-two-starts in
the network and IS3(Y ) is the number of in-three-stars in the network. C(θ) is the normalizing
constant. For readers interested in more detail on the ERGM and ERGM specification see
e.g., Wasserman and Pattison (1996), Cranmer and Desmarais (2011), Desmarais and Cranmer
(2012b), and Desmarais and Cranmer (2012a). The edges term, which counts the number of
connections in the network, is the ERGM equivalent of an intercept term in regression analysis.
An in-two-star is a configuration in which two nodes (states in this case) send a tie to a third
node. For each triple of nodes in a directed network there are three possible in-two-stars (i.e.,
one in which each of the nodes assumes the role of recipient of the two ties that form the in-two-
star). When there is a positive parameter associated with in-two-stars in an ERGM, senders of
new ties will seek to send ties to nodes that already receive many ties (i.e., a popularity effect).
An in-three-star, as the name implies, is a configuration in which three nodes each send a tie
to a target node. If in-three-stars is included in ERGM along with in-two-stars, and exhibits a
negative parameter value, the popularity effect lessens as a target node gains more ties. That is,
with positive in-two-stars and negative in-three-stars, a node becomes a more attractive recipient
as it begins to receive ties, but attraction to a node lessens as it gains a large number of ties
(i.e., analogous to a quadratic relationship in regression). This specification is chosen to give a
simple example of hyperdyadic interdependences and the parameter values are selected to create
a generative process based on moderated popularity. We generate 500 directed networks with 25
nodes from this ERGM.
We introduce potential confounding bias that is related to hyperdyadic dependence by con-
structing a covariate that derives from network structure, and is related to the number of ties sent
to the two nodes in a dyad. Suppose the relationships that constitute the simulated networks
are the issuance of economic sanctions such that Yij = 1 indicates that i has issued an economic
sanction against j. Now suppose that Xij represents the degree to which state i’s interests
overlaps with j’s (e.g., as measured through voting in the United Nations General Assembly).
Further assume that two states are likely to find their interests aligned when they are sanctioned
by the same states (i.e., the enemy of an enemy is a friend). Thus, the number of third states
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that sanction both i and j is a positive causal predictor of Xij , the interest alignment between
i and j. Note that i and j are likely to have common sanctioners if i and j are popular in the
sanctions network. Because the generative model for the artificial sanctions network is based
on popularity, any variable that is caused by the popularity of nodes in the sanction network
will be spuriously correlated with dyadic tie formation in the sanctions network, especially if
the empirical model does not account for the process of tie-formation based on popularity. We
construct Xij as the number of nodes in the simulated network that send ties to both i and j,
plus a normally distributed error. The confounding variable in this example is the number of
nodes that send ties to both i and j. Via the popularity dynamics built into the ERGM, this
variable is related to whether i sends a tie to j (i.e., if many nodes send a tie to j, then i will
want to send ties to j and i will have senders in common with j simply due to the large number
of nodes sending to j). This variable is also related to Xij , our hypothetical interest overlap
variable, in that states’ interests align when they are sanctioned by common states. If a model
included interest overlap between i and i (i.e., Xij as a dyadic predictor of whether i sanctioned j
(i.e., Yij) without accounting for the popularity of both i and j among other states, there would
be a high risk of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis that interest overlap between i and j
does not cause i to sanction j.
We estimated three different statistical models in each iteration of our simulation study. The
first was a dyadic logistic regression in which Yij was regressed on Xij (Dyadic Independence).
The second was a model in which Xij was added to the correctly specified ERGM (Full Model).
And the third was a model in which Xij was included in an erroneously specified ERGM (Mis-
specified Model). 4 In Figure 1, we present Type 1 error rates generated in our simulations.
We see that the full model exhibits a Type 1 error rate that is approximately 10–15 percentage
points lower than that of dyadic regression or a misspecified ERGM at conventionally used levels
of statistical significance. This simple simulation exercise illustrates that the omission of hyper-
dyadic structure from a model of relational data can increase Type 1 error through confounding.
Note that this is exactly what will happen with omitted variable bias. To wit, the inferential
pitfalls associated with omitting hyper-dyadic relational structure from a model of dyadic data
4The interdependence terms included in the Misspecified model include the geometrically weighted edgewise
shared partners statistic (GWESP) and the geometrically weighted out degree statistic (GWODEGREE). GWESP
models transitivity in a network – the tendency for two nodes to form a tie if those nodes have one or more common
(i.e., shared) partners. GWODEGREE models varying levels of sending (i.e., out ties) by nodes. See Snijders
et al. (2006) for detailed discussion of these statistics.
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are indistinguishable from those of the omitted variable bias. The Rcode needed to re-produce
this simulation is given in the Appendix.
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
P(
Ty
pe
 I 
Er
ro
r)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l l l
two−tailed p−value
l Full Model
Dyadic Independence
Misspecified Model
Figure 1: Type 1 error rates for different specifications of an exponential random graph model.
The dyadic independence model is logistic regression. Error rates are calculated over 500 itera-
tions of simulations of a 25 node network from an exponential random graph.
Conclusion
It is not valid to use dyadic methods in the face of hyperdyadic generative processes to draw
model-based inferences. Model based inferences are only as accurate as the statistical model
specification, and to relegate one’s specification to the class of dyadic independence models is
to erect an artificial barrier to sound model specification and inferenece. A researcher may
tolerate the use of an inferior class of statistical models in order to ease computational burdens,
but such tolerance is a purely individual and subjective question, which is beyond the focus of
our current commentary. Dyadic design is widespread, but we cannot quantify the extent to
which false inferences have been made without individually replicating each analysis; we can be
mathematically confident that all/most include some level of bias. The question then becomes
how much stock should we put in results that are known to be biased? We do not believe
that acknowledging the bias to readers and moving on is sufficient because the degree of bias is
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unquantified. Just like in a 12-step program, admitting you have a problem is important, but is
not enough on its own.
We argued that dyadic design is problematic from both a theoretical and empirical per-
spective. To summarize, we can only expect unbiased statistical results in extremely unlikely
situations, such as dyads not depending on one another in any way beyond the conditioning on
relational measures within the dyad, and even in such situations, dyadic design imposes a strong
and usually substantively untenable set of assumptions. We believe that these assumptions will
rarely if ever be met in interesting international politics applications, and, when they do not
cause bias or model misspecification, these assumptions result in treatments of the data that are
wildly unrealistic to even the analyst with the most basic knowledge of geopolitics.
Where does this leave us? We are of the opinion, and hope that the reader will also have
been convinced by this discussion, that dyadic design is nearly never appropriate for international
relations theory or data. The critical reader may convince herself that one or even several of
the points mentioned above do not apply to her data or problem, but we would have to be
outright wrong about every point we made above in order for dyadic design to be superior to
other easily available approaches. We see reason to doubt many published results based on
dyadic design, we do not believe that our critique should be cause for despair in the community
of international relations scholars. Rather, the development of empirical tools that can account
for nearly arbitrarily complex forms of interdependence present the opportunity for great strides
to be made in international relations theory. Our previous work in this area would suggest, for
example, that triadic closure (ties between all dyads in the ijk triple) is very common in positively
valanced (e.g., a tie is a “good” thing) networks like alliances (Cranmer et al., 2012b,a) and very
uncommon in negatively valanced networks like conflict (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011). A wide
variety of similar processes may be at work in international phenomena and are waiting to be
discovered. We believe that the field of international relations is on the cusp of a revolution in
how we treat complexity, both theoretically and empirically, and we look forward to an exciting
period of innovation as such complexity-oriented approaches permeate the field.
Appendix
# Set directory in which to store plots and results
# Users should change this to the full path to folder on the local machine
setwd("~/Desktop/")
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# set the seed in order to replicate exactly
set.seed(123)
# Necessary libraries
# sna is a general network analysis package with many useful functions
library(sna)
# ergm is a package for exponential random graph model estimation
library(ergm)
# set the number of iterations in the simulation
# increase for greater accuracy in error rate estimates
nsim <- 500
# create vectors in which to store p-values for each model
null.p <- numeric(nsim)
omit.p <- numeric(nsim)
miss.p <- numeric(nsim)
# loop over nsim iterations
for(i in 1:nsim){
# function rgraph in sna creates i.i.d. Bernoulli networks, here with probability 0.1
# net will serve at the initial network for simulating from ERGM using MCMC
net <- rgraph(25,1,.1)
# the simulate function simulates from ERGM
# MCMC starts at net and converges to a hyperdyadic dependence network
# edges term of -3.5 leads to relatively sparse networks (like most networks in IR)
# istar(2) term of 0.75 is a relatively strong popularity effect
# istar(3) term of -0.1 serves to moderate the popularity effect
net0 <- simulate(net~edges+istar(2)+istar(3), coef= c(-3.5,.75,-.1))
# dyadX is the shared sender spurious covariate
dyadX <- t(net0[,])%*%net0[,]+matrix(rnorm(25*25,sd=3/4),25,25)
# Run the correctly specified model
null_est <- ergm(net0 ~ edges+edgecov(dyadX)+istar(2:3))
# Run the misspecified erg
miss_est <- ergm(net0 ~ edges+edgecov(dyadX)+gwesp(0,fixed=T)+gwodegree(1,fixed=T))
# Run dyadic logit
omit_est <- ergm(net0 ~ edges+edgecov(dyadX))
# Extract and store p-values
null.p[i] <- summary(null_est)$coefs[2,4]
omit.p[i] <- summary(omit_est)$coefs[2,4]
miss.p[i] <- summary(miss_est)$coefs[2,4]
# print iteration to keep track/time
print(i)
}
# save results
save(list=c("null.p","omit.p","miss.p"),file="SimulationResults.RData")
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# Vector of significance levels at which to calculate the Type I error rate
p.vals <- seq(0.01,0.2,by=0.01)
# Calculate the Type I error rate of each model at each p-value
null.error <- numeric(length(p.vals))
omit.error <- numeric(length(p.vals))
miss.error <- numeric(length(p.vals))
for(i in 1:length(p.vals)){
null.error[i] <- mean(null.p < p.vals[i])
omit.error[i] <- mean(omit.p < p.vals[i])
miss.error[i] <- mean(miss.p < p.vals[i])
}
# Make the results plot
filei <- "type_one_error.pdf"
pdf(filei,height=3,width=3.5,pointsize=9,family="Times")
par(las=1,mar=c(4,5,1,1),cex.lab=1.25,cex.axis=1)
plot(p.vals,null.error,type="n",ylab="P(Type I Error)",xlab="",ylim=c(0,0.7))
abline(h=seq(.05,.7,by=.05),lty=3,col="grey70")
abline(v=seq(.025,2,by=.025),lty=3,col="grey70")
lines(p.vals,omit.error,lwd=1.5,col="red")
lines(p.vals,null.error,lwd=1.5,col="blue")
lines(p.vals,miss.error,lwd=1.5)
points(p.vals,omit.error,lwd=1.5,col="red",pch=4,cex=.85)
points(p.vals,null.error,lwd=1.5,col="blue",pch=1,cex=.85)
points(p.vals,miss.error,lwd=1.5,pch=6,cex=.85)
title(xlab="two-tailed p-value",line=2.25)
#abline(0,1)
legend("bottomright",legend=c("miss.pecified Model","Dyadic Independence","Full Model")[c(3,2,1)],col=c("black","red","blue")[c(3,2,1)],pch=c(6,4,1)[c(3,2,1)],bg="white")
dev.off()
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